The integrity and independence of the judiciary are the twin pillars of constitutional democracy. However, the recent Justice Yashwant Varma affair—involving a probe initiated under the supervision of Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and recommendations by Justice Sanjiv Khanna— has reignited national debate on the adequacy of India’s mechanisms for judicial accountability. This research seeks to evaluate the potential amendment and reform of the judicial conduct and removal regime through a combined doctrinal-empirical approach. It will analyse the constitutional and statutory framework governing judicial conduct (Arts. 124–137, 217–222 of the Constitution; Judges [Inquiry] Act 2, 1968), examine procedural lacunae revealed by the Varma inquiry, and propose a methodological framework to assess future reforms. The study situates the case within the broader question of how India can reconcile judicial independence with accountability and transparency. This research explores how the Justice Varma episode and Justice Khanna’s proactive stance may signal the beginning of a long-overdue amendment to the judicial accountability framework in India. Adopting a mixed-method approach that integrates doctrinal legal analysis with empirical qualitative research, the study examines constitutional provisions (Articles 124–147 and 217–222), the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, and the 1999 in-house procedure to identify institutional gaps and reform needs. It further draws comparative insights from other common-law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Canada, where judicial conduct mechanisms operate with transparency and independence. By framing a methodological model that evaluates both legal norms and real-world perceptions, this research aims to contribute to scholarly and policy discourse on how India can evolve a codified, transparent, and ethically resilient framework for judicial accountability—one that safeguards both public confidence and judicial autonomy.