



# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ADVANCE RESEARCH, IDEAS AND INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY

ISSN: 2454-132X

Impact Factor: 6.078

(Volume 11, Issue 2 - V11I2-1265)

Available online at: <https://www.ijariit.com>

## Cybersecurity and National Security: Constitutional Issues in Digital Governance

Rituraj Malik

[malikrituraj9@gmail.com](mailto:malikrituraj9@gmail.com)

Amity University, Noida, Uttar Pradesh

### ABSTRACT

*The research examines security connections between AI advancements and national security and constitutional governance within the Indian framework. Digital development in India has created obstacles for its constitutional framework that must balance cybersecurity requirements with cyber liberties safeguards. The closed connection between cybersecurity systems and national defence created new regulatory gaps requiring fresh constitutional reform. This paper examines how fundamental rights in Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution protect against digital threats. The Proportionality standard created in the Puttaswamy judgment for examining security measures has not been correctly executed within Indian cybersecurity governance operations. The separation of cyber threat responsibilities between the state and national governments remains unclear because traditional federal administrative structures cause difficulties when facing cross-jurisdictional threats. The original Information Technology Act of 2000 in India exists as pre-modern legislation to defend citizens against executive surveillance, but remains inadequate in these matters. The adoption of artificial intelligence technologies by national security operations creates constitutional tensions through machine-learning techniques that lead to issues explaining algorithm operations and automated system procedures. Previous judicial decisions in their outcomes and international cybersecurity strategies serve as research material to identify effective constitutional oversight models. The paper presents three proposed reforms establishing dedicated oversight bodies to enforce surveillance oversight and judicial supervision of security operations and set controls for AI systems in security applications. Analyzing Indian cybersecurity policies against constitutional requirements for security and personal rights enhances digital constitutional evolution beneficial to nations working on developing digital regulatory frameworks for people safety and national security.*

**Keywords:** Cybersecurity, National Security, Indian Constitution, Digital Governance, Artificial Intelligence, Privacy, Data Protection, Surveillance

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental making of the relationship between the citizen and the state throughout the world has been due to the digitalisation of governance systems. This transformation has taken place particularly in India, and Digital India has enabled such a transformation of public service delivery and civic engagement.

Regarding other freedoms, the freedom to speak in the digital realm as well, however, has been achieved through nothing less than a profound transformation of the material world that presents its novel security problems for which traditional constitutional doctrines provide no satisfactory reply. Known cybersecurity threats like data theft and state-sponsored attacks impact national security and even pose a question to the basic human rights in the digital world.

That landscape has also evolved through artificial intelligence (AI). The same powerful tools that AI technologies may bring for the benefit of cybersecurity capabilities may also produce new vulnerabilities and constitutional concerns. It raises questions of accountability, transparency, and the protection of fundamental rights as framed in the Indian constitution about the use of algorithms in influencing decisions more and more in the security context.

The paper analyses the process by which India's constitutional framework strives to negotiate the complicated interrelationship between Cybersecurity, National Security and web-based governance. The paper analyses the competing security demands and the fundamental constitutional values of privacy, expression and due process. This paper aims to identify the gaps in the review set out above by looking at recent legislative, judicial and policy developments, also proposing reforms which do not compromise the requirement of security but rather try to strike a balance between that need and constitutional principles.

India is urged to take up a complete constitutional approach towards cybersecurity by recognising the threats in cybersecurity and distinctive rights as well. For this, we need an approach that can effectively adjust itself, while still holding on to constitutional values, to the emergent technologies such as AI. This paper enters the discussion of the emerging literature of digital constitutionalism in India, and the findings from this paper would be helpful to develop the framework for governance of cybersecurity for developing countries.

## **2. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL GOVERNANCE IN INDIA**

### **2.1 Constitutional Foundations**

While India's constitutional framework was not designed with digital governance in mind, various provisions of the same have become more relevant in the context of cybersecurity. Article 21, on the right to life and personal liberty, has been expansively interpreted by the Supreme Court to encompass the right to privacy, which is a vital consideration in matters related to digital surveillance, as also data protection. Likewise, Article 19(1)(a), which protects the freedom of speech and expression, is of great importance regarding internet censorship or content regulation under the pretext of cybersecurity.

The equally important limitations on these rights are imposed. Article 19(2) provides for the reasonable restriction of the right to free speech for reasons of "sovereignty and integrity of India," "security of the State"-clauses that are often used to rationalise digital surveillance, and content takedowns. Protection from digital surveillance by Article 21 is not absolute because its liberty can be restricted by 'procedure established by law,' and hence, raises an issue about what procedural safeguards are required for digital surveillance.

### **2.2 The Right to Privacy Judgment and Its Implications**

The landmark decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Change in the constitutional landscape for digital governance in India was primarily brought about by Union of India (2017). The Supreme Court made privacy a constitutional standard by which the security measures can be evaluated if recognised under Article 21 as a fundamental right. Any government intrusion into the realm of privacy, the Court well outlined, must be legal, serve a legitimate purpose, and be proportional.

Specifically, in his opinion, Justice Chandrachud also highlighted the privacy issues of big data and algorithmic governance, stating that "the growth and development of technology has brought into existence fresh machinery for the possible infringement of privacy by the State through surveillance, profiling and compilation and dealing of data." By recognising the technology-specific privacy concerns, there exists a constitutional basis by which to judge AI-driven measures of security.

### **2.3 Federalism in Cybersecurity Governance**

Additionally, the state and/or the Union of the government will add complexity to cybersecurity governance, as there is a constitutional division of powers. Since Cybersecurity is not covered in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, there is ambiguity in regulating it. Although "defense" and "foreign affairs" are covered by the entry 1 and 10 of the Union List (List I), which coincides with primacy of the central government concerning national security matters, issues of "public order" and "police" are listed under the State List (List II) – Entry 1 and 2 — which gives states power over a lot of the cybercrime issues.

Then there's the issue that cyber threats have a transnational nature, further complicating federal complexity. In this sense, the constitutional framework gives rise to potential conflicts of jurisdiction and coordination when responding to cybersecurity incidents that affect more than one state or have an international dimension.

## **3. CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT**

### **3.1 The Evolving Threat Landscape**

A range of cybersecurity problems plagues India, the most immediate of which are recognised to endanger national security. In 2021 alone, India witnessed over 1.4 million cybersecurity incidents, including more such incidents such as attacks on critical infrastructure, government agencies and defence establishments targeted by such attacks, according to the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). These threats now vary from simple website defacements to very advanced APTS with state sponsorship behind them. Concerns are posed by targeting critical information infrastructure. Potentially widespread disruption and threats to public safety can be seen because of attacks on power grids, financial systems and telecommunications networks. At the same time, an incident in the 2020 power grid in Mumbai, being put to blame on the Chinese state actors, depicted the possibility of cyber operations affecting vital services. Such incidents are a blurring of the traditional lines between cybersecurity and national security, and thus, complex constitutional questions of the appropriate state response.

### **3.2 Legislative Framework and Its Limitations**

India's prime law for the problem of cybersecurity is the Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008), a legislation enacted before many of those cyber threats and technology currently in vogue. As per the section 69 of the Act, the government has been given power that includes the wide ambit of interception, monitoring and decryption of any information to "maintain the sovereignty and integrity of India, the defense of India, security of a State, Friendly relations with foreign States, the maintenance of public order, or preventing of incitement to the commission of any cognizable offense or for investigation into any offense". Section 69a provides an exactly similar platform for blocking online content on such grounds.

These provisions have been criticised as being for the broadest scope and the weakest oversight provisions. There is no independent judicial oversight in the procedures for interception under the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 (through executive review by an executive committee). Further, it amounts to a possible violation of the mandate of checks and balances, as guaranteed in Puttaswamy, as also a lack of adequate protections of privacy rights recognised in this landmark judgment.

Despite many iterations of the Personal Data Protection Bill, the same is still pending, and a big legislation hole remains in the cybersecurity legal architecture of India. For example, in practice, there was no clear answer, even at the statutory level, on data security, breach notification or protection of cross-border data flow absence of a comprehensive and applicable data protection framework.

### 3.3 Institutional Challenges and Capacity Constraints

Cybersecurity is much more than legal frameworks; it is also dependent on the capacity of institutions underlying constitutional governance. To counter the rising cyber threats, India has set up several agencies such as CERT-In, National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), and the Defence Cyber-Agency. These institutions, however, have technical expertise and staffing issues as well as coordination problems.

Implementing the constitutional principle of accountability in the cybersecurity field is especially challenging due to operations being classified for national security reasons. Because of the opacity of state agency cyber operations, the transparency and judicial review requirements of the Constitution come into tension. While operational effectiveness may require these institutional secrets, there is the problem of possible rights violations in secrecy, beyond public knowledge and scrutiny.

## 4. AI AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE NEW FRONTIER

### 4.1 AI Applications in National Security

Both a powerful tool to improve cybersecurity and a new source of vulnerabilities and constitutional challenges, we find that artificial intelligence is truly a double-edged sword. The Indian government has started to use AI technologies extensively under national security operations and uses them to monitor networks, detect threats and perform predictive analytics. AI's active presence was also recognised, in 2020, in the National Security Strategy on Artificial Intelligence, which identifies AI as a strategic technology and a technology that is at the Centre of various security implications.

Some laboratories are aimed at autonomous systems and intelligence in defence organisations such as the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Along the same lines, the intelligence agencies are using AI to scour through the enormous datasets of data they have obtained via their surveillance programs. Yet, there are several questions regarding constitutional oversight safeguards that will accompany these applications for greater operational efficiency.

### 4.2 Constitutional Implications of AI-Driven Security

Whereas AI security measures raise unprecedented constitutional issues, the relevant legal means to address them are poorly equipped. Algorithmic decisions may sometimes occur within the settings of the security context, where such decisions would interfere with the fundamental rights in unclear or contestable ways. Then, one starts wondering if due process applies, how one can support nondiscrimination, and how one can guarantee effective redress when machine learning systems are used to develop patterns and predict outcomes that have security operations inherently affected by them.

Of relevance for constitutional governance, however, are specific problems that opacity introduces into many AI systems. Such complex machine learning algorithms are essentially 'black boxes', and it might thus be challenging to determine whether black box algorithms make decisions in conformity with constitutional standards or include prohibited forms of bias. Obtaining such technical opacity for purposes of decision-making, unaccounted for judicially in review, is inconsistent with reasoned decision-making.

### 4.3 India's Regulatory Approach to AI in Security

Currently, India is in the nascent stages of its approach to regulating AI in security contexts. According to the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (NITI Aayog, 2018), security applications are acknowledged, however, it lacks guidance in ensuring constitutional safeguards. And similarly, the National Cyber Security Strategy 2020 speaks of AI, yet it does not create a comprehensive governance system for algorithmic security systems.

Such absence of AI-specific legislation leaves the uncertainty relating to the application of the constitutional principles to these technologies. This area of law is still courts have yet to develop a sufficient jurisprudence around AI when it comes to security contexts and are still grappling with how we might apply the principles from Puttaswamy and other constitutional decisions in the context of governance and algorithms. What's particularly concerning is that these are technologies that are rapidly being deployed by security agencies in this regulatory gap.

## 5. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO DIGITAL RIGHTS AND SECURITY

### 5.1 Evolving Jurisprudence on Surveillance

Indian courts have grappled with balancing security imperatives against constitutional rights in digital surveillance cases. In *PUCI v. Union of India* (1997), the Supreme Court established guidelines for telephone tapping, requiring procedural safeguards and emphasising the exceptional nature of surveillance. These principles were reaffirmed in *Shreya Singhal v. Union of India* (2015), where the Court read down Section 66A of the IT Act while emphasising that restrictions on digital expression must meet constitutional thresholds of reasonableness.

More recently, the Delhi High Court's decision in *Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India* (2021) addressed the "right to be forgotten" in digital contexts, recognising that personal information available online can have significant privacy implications. This emerging digital rights jurisprudence suggests judicial willingness to adapt constitutional principles to the digital environment.

### 5.2 Judicial Review of Security Programs

Since digital surveillance has been developed, courts have given varying amounts of deference to executive claims about national security when reviewing those programs.

In *Internet Freedom Foundation v. the surveillance system NATGRID* has been challenged by the Union of India in the Supreme Court by cautiously proceeding into the matter by asking for government responses while not issuing any interim order to disrupt security operations. The challenges to the constitutional validity of the CMS (Centralised Monitoring System) are following suit in the courts. The Supreme Court's approach in the Aadhaar case offers some guidance on how courts can evaluate digital security programs in the Union of India (2018). Although it upheld the constitutionality of the biometric identity system, the Court drastically limited its use and forcefully stressed the need to take all necessary steps to prevent data fraud and refrain from giving excessive surveillance capabilities.

### **5.3 Challenges in Judicial Oversight**

Multiple operational difficulties exist in providing effective judicial control of cybersecurity procedures. The judges encounter problems because they must analyze complex technical aspects which makes it hard to determine the proportionality and necessity of surveillance technologies or methodologies. Many security operations fall under classified status, thereby creating problems for courts to fulfil their task of conducting complete judicial reviews when they hesitate to request sensitive operational details.

The procedural complexities prevent the court from handling cybersecurity affairs. The defences against intelligence breaches comprise various requirements and challenges in proving harm and determining jurisdiction. Digitally crucial constitutional questions struggle to reach judicial resolution due to the Supreme Court's increasing backlog, thus permitting unauthorised security measures to exist for years through the continuous growth of pending litigation.

## **6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: GLOBAL APPROACHES**

### **6.1 Constitutional Models for Cybersecurity Governance**

Different constitutional democracies use assorted approaches when they manage cybersecurity practices against constitutional protections of rights. Judicial surveillance under the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has lost effectiveness since the Snowden information disclosure. The German Federal Constitutional Court defends fundamental rights and effectively intervenes by objecting to surveillance rules that fail to protect them adequately.

Data protection in the European Union functions through the GDPR as well as the Fundamental Rights Charter standards that limit national security decisions. Democratic surveillance frameworks need precise legal authorisations to conduct surveillance operations and must perform tests that validate the proportionality level.

### **6.2 Lessons for India's Constitutional Framework**

India can benefit from understanding the frameworks adopted by countries worldwide to develop its approach to cybersecurity. The German requirement for parliamentary review of intelligence operations can help India fill its present domain gaps in oversight accountability. Executive oversight can be controlled by independent supervisory authorities, which are mandated by the EU to protect data in a manner consistent with constitutional principles.

Indian law diverges from international practice by relying on executive review of surveillance initiatives, even though these practices demonstrate judicial authorisation agreements found in *Puttaswamy*. The requirement for institutional transparency in different democratic setups, including surveillance activity disclosures, helps Indian security systems fulfil constitutional obligations.

### **6.3 International Obligations and Constitutional Interpretation**

The international agreements entered into by India affect how courts interpret the constitution in cybersecurity situations. India, as an ICCPR signatory, faces international commitments about privacy along with expressing freedoms that must guide constitutional interpretation. The interpretations made by the UN Human Rights Committee about digital rights serve as useful guidance when Indian courts address similar issues.

The Indo-Pacific region promotes possibilities for cybersecurity method alignment with constitutional principles through regional cooperation. Participation in these frameworks by India necessitates domestic practices to meet international standards, which could result in enhanced security-based rights protection across the country.

## **7. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **7.1 Constitutional Reforms for the Digital Age**

India needs to modify its constitutional structure to handle the specific security threats from cybersecurity and AI technologies. A specialised constitutional body comparable to the Election Commission should become operational with the responsibility of overseeing both digital rights and security affairs. A specialised constitutional body would have the power to independently investigate security surveillance practices by ensuring both law compliance and legitimate security objectives.

Amendments to the constitution by directly mentioning privacy and data protection would generate better bases to establish digital rights. The judicial confirmation of privacy rights in *Puttaswamy* was crucial, yet textual amendments to the constitution regarding digital rights would create firm guidelines for courts and decision-makers when they protect individual liberties against security needs.

### **7.2 Legislative and Regulatory Proposals**

Several legal changes could build on the current structure of cybersecurity governance according to the constitution. A thorough surveillance law with three key components, including judicial oversight and requirements for limited aims and setting transparency standards, would remedy constitutional issues observed in the present procedures. The legislation should implement the proportionality standard exactly as explained in the *Puttaswamy* decision.

Special regulations about AI need to establish constitutional frameworks for security applications to function properly.

The regulatory framework needs to establish rules for analysing rights impacts and explainable algorithm deployment within security operations, and provide control mechanisms for automated security systems. The proposed AI Act by the European Union serves as a relevant model that India can adapt within its constitutional framework.

### 7.3 Institutional Capacity Building

Sound constitutional management of cybersecurity needs government institutions to develop strong capabilities throughout all governing bodies. The judiciary requires specific knowledge of complex surveillance technologies and AI platforms for proper evaluation. Legal professionals should receive specialised training as well as technical support from courts through advisors and ongoing development of digital rights jurisprudence skills among judicial experts.

Legislative capacity also requires enhancement. Parliamentary oversight committees staffed with adequate technical expertise as well as security clearances, can carry out effective cybersecurity operation reviews. Both legal and technical expertise within independent regulatory entities would confirm compliance of security practices to constitutional norms while ensuring their capacity to adjust to developing dangers.

## 8. CONCLUSION

Legal India faces significant obstacles in dealing with cybersecurity connected to national security demands alongside constitutional administrative requirements. Digitisation in state-citizen interactions demands constitutional principles to develop innovative methods for fundamental rights protection, which include response strategies to developing security threats. The implementation of artificial intelligence systems produced numerous challenges affecting this range of operational space while straining traditional constitutional frameworks because of AI capabilities, as well as inherent system vulnerabilities.

The country faces challenges because it has not successfully implemented constitutional solutions to solve these problems. Multiple areas concerning legislative structure development, with institutional capacity growth and regulatory techniques, must be actively built upon following the Puttaswamy legal decision. Multiple aspects of data security regulations, combined with inadequate monitoring facilities while presenting weak disclosure protocols, have led to conflicting national principles in cybersecurity governance operations. The advancement of India's cybersecurity standards requires developing unique procedures that protect national security while ensuring total rights protection for freedom and civil liberties. A proper cybersecurity model should adopt three fundamental aspects, including technological capabilities as well as international collaboration mechanisms alongside constitutional structure guidelines. India holds the opportunity to develop governance frameworks that combine digital security protection with individual freedoms by implementing constitutional approaches for the problems caused by AI systems and related advanced technologies.

The problems related to digital governance affect how states exercise their power, together with the individual rights guaranteed by democratic systems. The digital revolution of India requires security measures that uphold constitutional protections between individual liberty and national safety in this planet's biggest democratic realm.

## REFERENCES

- [1] Acharya, B. (2022). Surveillance reform in India: Constitutional challenges and future directions. *Indian Journal of Constitutional Law*, 14(1), 45-67.
- [2] Basu, A., & Hickok, E. (2018). Artificial Intelligence in the Governance Sector in India. The Centre for Internet & Society, India.
- [3] Chandrachud, D. V. (2017). Judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
- [4] Chima, R. J., & Kaur, A. (2021). National security, surveillance and the rule of law. In P. Mehta & S. Shankar (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution* (pp. 421-440). Oxford University Press.
- [5] DSCI. (2022). *India Cybersecurity Industry Report*. Data Security Council of India.
- [6] Gurumurthy, A., & Chami, N. (2022). Data sovereignty and digital constitutionalism: An Indian perspective. *Digital Constitutionalism in Asia and the Global South*, 7(2), 112-134.
- [7] Jain, P. (2021). AI governance in India: Constitutional perspectives and policy challenges. *Harvard Journal of Law & Technology*, 34(2), 523-557.
- [8] Kamra, S., & Kapoor, R. (2023). The constitutional dimensions of cybersecurity law: Charting a path for India. *National Law School of India Review*, 35(1), 78-96.
- [9] Kumar, A. P. (2022). State surveillance and constitutional rights in India: A comparative study. *Columbia Journal of Asian Law*, 35(2), 211-234.
- [10] MEITY. (2022). *National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence*. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India.
- [11] Mohanty, B. (2021). Examining constitutional challenges to digital surveillance in India. *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, 12(1), 167-185.
- [12] NITI Aayog. (2021). *Responsible AI for All: Adopting the Framework*. National Institution for Transforming India.
- [13] Parsheera, S. (2022). AI and national security: Constitutional perspectives from India. *International Journal of Law and Information Technology*, 30(2), 129-151.
- [14] Prakash, P., & Gupta, K. (2021). The legal framework for cybersecurity in India: A critical analysis. *Indian Journal of Law and Technology*, 17(1), 35-59.
- [15] Rao, M. S., & Kumar, S. (2022). Federalism and cybersecurity governance in India. *Federal Law Review*, 50(3), 415-437.